This article advances an alternative paradigm for making judgments about China's compliance with its international obligations in the realm of health and human rights, grounded on the reality that non-local rule regimes are interpreted and applied according to the extent of commonality between the norms underlying these international rule regimes and local cultural norms. This paradigm, "selective adaptation," allows us to determine that China complied with its international obligations in the case of SARS, but not HIV/AIDS. It makes visible how during SARS China eventually complied with the spirit of the international sanitation regulations but the lack of commitment to improving access to health care for persons living with HIV/AIDS reflects a failure by China to guarantee the right to adequate health care.
This paper advances an alternative paradigm ("selective adaptation") for making judgments about China's compliance with its international obligations in the realm of health and human rights. This alternative paradigm involves examining compliance with international human rights standards through reference to the role of local popular norms in mediating acceptance of non-local rules. The broader point is that, when international treaties are ratified by States parties, that ratification does not de facto make those rules local. Rather, selective adaptation is the process by which those rules become localized. It provides a model for understanding critically the reality that non-local rule regimes are interpreted and applied according to the extent of commonality between the norms underlying these international rule regimes and local cultural norms.
Two recent cases are examined in which China's compliance with its international obligations concerning health and human rights has been questioned. The one concerns China's response to the SARS crisis, and the other, its treatment of persons living with HIV/AIDS. Selective adaptation allows us to determine that China complied with its international obligations in the case of SARS, but not HIV/AIDS. In particular, selective adaptation makes visible the fact that, during the SARS outbreak, China eventually complied with the spirit of the requirements of the international sanitation regulations. In contrast, however, China's lack of commitment to improving access to health care for persons living with HIV/AIDS reflects its failure to comply with its international obligations with regard to the right to adequate health care.
The point of these two contrasting assessments is to illustrate how interpretations of international standards in the area of health and human rights can be critically yet flexibly applied in China, and indeed perhaps elsewhere, without embracing notions of cultural relativism. What both examples draw out is that many of the PRC's challenges with regard to health and international human rights have little to do with the cultural or economic particularities of China. Instead, they reflect the fact that in China, both the provision of health care and measures to control the spread of infectious disease are principally within the domain of local and municipal governments, and that the country has failed to develop adequately the means by which it can ensure that its national commitments to health are implemented by these actors.
China's International Obligations
At issue for China with respect to health and human rights are two distinct sets of international obligations, one of which is rights-based and the other not. One set of international obligations arises from the variety of international sanitary conventions that date originally to the late l9th century and were consolidated into the International Health Regulations (IHR) by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 195 1.3 These regulations, designed to prevent the international spread of infectious diseases, require states to notify the international community of outbreaks of certain diseases and maintain public health facilities that could regulate international points of entry and exit. Since 1983, IHR for infectious diseases had applied to only three diseases -cholera, plague, and yellow fever -which meant that the regulations did not address new infectious diseases such as SARS and Avian Flu. At the time of the SARS crisis, WVO was in the process of amending its IHR to better deal with new and emerging infectious diseases. In May 2005, WHO formally adopted new IHR designed to apply to all public health risks, not just those stemming from cholera, plague, and yellow fever. 4 China's other set of international obligations in the realm of health and human rights revolves around its international commitments to provide individuals with an adequate standard of health care. These obligations are set out in international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (which China finally ratified in 2001), as well as the more recent Millennium Declaration. The latter is perhaps the most important recent international initiative in the area of human development related to health care rights, even though it has been largely ignored by the international human rights community. 5 Serious questions about whether China is meeting these two sets of obligations have been raised recently by the international community. In the case of the IHR, the perception that China is at the epicenter of some newly emerging infectious diseases has raised concerns about the extent to which it has fulfilled its responsibilities to provide notification of such outbreaks and maintained public health facilities that can respond to them. In the case of human rights related to health care, significant economic changes in PRC have brought parallel changes to its system of health care provision, raising concerns about the effects on certain marginalized populations.
Flexibility of International Obligations
The difficulty in assessing China's performance related to these two sets of obligations stems from the broader problem of determining the extent to which the demands of the human right to health should be regarded as flexible in developing countries such as China. The international human rights community seems to be of two minds about this problem. In the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, for example, the signatories claimed, The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic, and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.6
The underlying point, in theory, is that all international human rights are held to be universal and designed to be culturally neutral.7 As is well known, however, Article 2 of the ICESCR allows for "progressive realization." The underlying principle is designed to acknowledge that countries lack the resources to fully realize human rights such as the right to adequate health care, and hence must constantly strive to improve their performance.
China's official discourses on the right to health operate in the shadow of its norms of governance and the right to development.8 In terms of governance, norms of "patrimonial sovereignty" suggest that administrative agencies and regulators may have responsibility for society but are not responsible (accountable) to it.9 Instead, health regulators are accountable primarily to their bureaucratic and political superiors, and as a result, have few obligations to meet the substantive needs of either Chinese citizens or those of the international community. In effect, this relegates protection of individual human rights secondary to the primacy of the state. Notice, however, that conduct of this sort is neither inherently arbitrary nor discriminatory. 10 The Chinese government's views on the right to development also have implications for the centrality of the state as the source of rights and as the determinant of the beneficiaries of rights. In contrast to constitutional theories that view rights as inalienable and intrinsic to the human condition, the PRC Constitution speaks of rights enjoyed by the people. Article 33 of the PRC Constitution conditions the extension of rights on performance of the "duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law." Under this approach, rights are not inherent to the human condition, but rather are specific benefits conferred and enforced at the discretion of the state." The state's role here is one of patrimonial sovereign, which entails not the recognition of fundamental rights of members of society but rather the conferring of rights on particular members of society subject to those members meeting specific conditions or requirements. On this view, the human right to health is conferred by the state and is thus subject to state interests and the state's interpretation of social interests. As indicated by the PRC's 2000 Human Rights White Paper, human rights remain generally subject to the needs of national development and thus appear to be conditioned on the pursuit of reform, development, and stability.12 Therefore, in securing the human right to health, issues such as access to health care; the detection, reporting, treatment, and monitoring of infectious diseases; and the protection of systemic supports for human health are subsumed under broader state goals for national development.
The progressive realization provision of the ICESCR allows for some flexibility in its demands on member states. Are China's official discourses on health and human rights consistent with the underlying principle? China's flexibility HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS in its compliance with its international health and human rights obligations raises the concern that any substantive recognition of non-compliance is at risk of being lost. Should this occur, the specific content of the international obligations at issue is neglected, and it is here that some of the most serious violations of human rights to health can occur. ' 
The Paradigm of Selective Adaptation
This article offers an application of "selective adaptation" as an alternative paradigm for thinking about the flexibility of judgments of China's non-compliance with inter-national obligations in the realm of health and human rights. Selective adaptation in this context involves a dynamic by which international rule regimes are mediated by local cultural norms.17 Thus, universal human rights standards related to the right to adequate health care, for example, will in practice be interpreted according to local norms concerning such matters as the relationship between individual and collective claims, expectations about health, and the delivery of health care. The broader point is that when international agreements are ratified by state parties, ratification does not de facto make those rules local. 18 The paradigm of selective adaptation may also be seen to operate by reference to factors of perception, complementarity, and legitimacy. Perception influences understanding about foreign rules and local norms and practices. In the area of human rights related to health care, this may involve perceptions about what international human rights require in terms of health care priorities, outcomes, and processes, as well as perceptions about local conditions and expectations. Complementarity describes a circumstance by which apparently contradictory phenomena can be combined in ways that preserve essential characteristics of each component and yet allow for them to operate together in mutually reinforcing and effective ways. In the health care area, for example, complementarity may help explain how international standards for assessment of health needs and delivery of health care can accommodate local practices. Legitimacy concerns the extent to which members of local communities support the purposes and consequences of international standards. Thus, in the health care sector, popular reactions to state-controlled reporting on infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, and Avian Flu may signal varying levels of legitimacy for the process of localizing international standards.
Although selective adaptation offers the potential to understand dynamics of localization of international human rights standards, it also works to limit efforts to insulate or excuse government behavior from human rights criticism. The key determinant in selective adaptation is the relationship between the norms underlying international human rights standards and local cultural norms. Understanding compliance requires more that simply comparing local per-formance against international requirements. Rather, compliance can be understood more clearly by examining the extent to which norms underlying the international standards are consonant with local norms. Doing so can help explain compliance outcomes by differentiating between those situations where non-compliance is the result of normative conflict, and those cases where local norms are consistent with the norms of the international regime but local practices fail to satisfy international standards. Where demonstrable conflicts exist between international rule regimes and local popular norms, accommodation to cultural differences might be useful. Non-compliance unrelated to factors of normative consensus, however, cannot be excused by reference to cultural differences.
In These contrasting assessments illustrate how the paradigm of selective adaptation enables us to assess critically whether China is complying with its international obligations in the area of health and human rights at the same time that we acknowledge the cultural particularities of the Chinese context. Specifically, selective adaptation helps to make visible the fact that, in China, non-compliance with international human rights obligations related to health is often not an issue of cultural difference so much as a failure of local authorities to make the right to health an overriding priority. Ironically, the legitimacy of the international demands on China during the SARS crisis stemmed from the fact that, aside from using a uniform case definition of a SARS patient, WHO gave individual countries discretion over the measures that they could take to control the epidemic. WHO left it to the discretion of local jurisdictions, for example, to use quarantine within certain limitations.37 In China, as in the United States, public health decisions are decentralized, and local authorities are traditionally the ones who make decisions regarding public health issues. This practice meant that despite WHO's presence during the SARS crisis, policies were developed locally, not nationally. These numbers are significant for two reasons. The first is that they highlight how little control the national government has over the day-to-day routine provision of health care throughout the country. 45 Although the health care agenda of the national government does include re-establishing an equitable and accessible health care system, it lacks the financial leverage to apply pressure on local governments to implement this agenda. The numbers are also significant in that they portray dramatic differences in public spending on health care across the country, depending on the wealth of the region. The contrast is most stark in terms of the proportion of public spending in urban versus rural areas. Urban areas receive 80% of total public spending, according to the World Bank, even though 70% of the population lives in rural areas. Moreover, during the past 20 years, health care in China has also become much more expensive, with average annual increases of 11 %. In Shanghai, for instance, hospital costs increased by 53% between 1993 and 1994. 46 Rapidly escalating health care costs, combined with shifts from public to private funding, have impacted access to care. In the carly 1980s, 80% of Chinese citizens had access to health care of reasonable quality. 47 The coverage of public health insurance in rural areas then dropped, from 85% to less than 10%, by the mid-1990s. In urban areas, the number of people without health insurance increased from 27% to 44% in a mere five-year period, from 1993 to 1998.48 The shift in China has been to a health care system where user fees and out-of-pocket costs for patients amounted to 58% of the total spending in 2002, compared to 20% in 1978, and spending on pharmaceutical drugs now accounts for half of the total health care expenditures. 49 The 
Conclusion
The above analysis of SARS and HIV in China is intended to show the insights that the paradigm of selective adaptation can yield for judging China's compliance with its international obligations in the realm of health and human rights. Indicators of perception, complementarity, and legitimacy, along with the government's commitment to greater transparency in reporting on SARS and to cooperation with WHO reveal China's potential for compliance with its international obligations in cases involving emerging infectious diseases such as Avian Flu. As we have shown in the context of HIV, however, the same indicators reveal that there is little substantive commitment to improving access to health care for those most vulnerable in Chinese society when that commitment conflicts with the demands of economic and political reforms. Even if we provide for the cultural particularities of China, this lack of commitment to improving access to health care for persons living with HIV/AIDS reflects a failure on China's part to comply with its international obligations with regard to the right to adequate health care. What both examples draw out is that many of the PRC's challenges with regard to health and human rights reflect the fact that, in China, both the provision of health care and measures to control the spread of infectious diseases are principally within the institutional domain of local and municipal governments. China has failed to develop adequately the means by which it can ensure that its national agenda on health is implemented by these governments.
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As a result, a rights-based approach to health in China must look beyond the platitudes and policies of the national government and examine the complex and diverse forms in which health policy is realized at the local level. Such an approach also requires caution in accepting the findings of national reports from the PRC, including those related to the achievement of targets set out by the Millennium Development Goals. Moreover, in efforts to bolster such an approach to health care in China, external NGOs concerned with furthering a rights-based agenda in the country should always work with local partners.
The analysis in this article also has implications for health and human rights in countries other than China. As noted at the outset, in the realm of health, claims about the universality of human rights principles often concede that human rights standards should be applied flexibly so as to accommodate a country's cultural particularity or stage of economic and legal development. A strength of the paradigm of selective adaptation in the case of China is the way in which it makes visible the fact that non-compliance with international human rights to health is often not an issue of cultural difference but rather a failure of local authorities to make the right to health an overriding priority. In other countries, the institutional failings made visible through selective adaptation may not revolve around the lack of control that the national government has over local governments but rather a different concern, such the undue influence of private health insurance companies or transnational firms. Within the paradigm of selective adaptation, these or other failures should not be confused with a government's being flexible for the sake of the country's cultural particularities or in recognition of its stage of economic development.
